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World Environmental and Water Resources Congress 2017                                                    381




               1639 ft. The last step is clearly observed in construction photos at the time (Outland, 1977), five
               feet below Outlet No. 1, at an elevation of 1645 ft. The cross section presented by BWWS to all
               of the investigative panels after the failure was not an accurate portrayal of the dam’s maximum
               section, especially  with regards to estimating the factor of safety with regards to cantilever
               overturning (even ignoring uplift).
                       These discrepancies resulted in erroneous evaluations of the dam’s static stability by most
               of the investigative panels in 1928 (Rogers, 1992; 1995). Rogers and McMahon (1993) showed
               that the dam’s maximum section became unstable in cantilever overturning when the reservoir
               rose to elevation 1830 ft, seven feet below the spillway sill. Although ignored in the original
               design, the arch stresses began exceeding 7000 pounds per square foot (psf) at elevation 1822 ft,
               increasing to 10,000 psf at elevation 1830, five feet below spillway crest. The reservoir had been
               brought up to within 4 ft of the spillway for 17 days in mid-May 1927, but was not filled to
               capacity until March 2, 1928, 10 days prior to the failure (Fig. 2).
































               Figure 2. Daily record of reservoir elevations between March 1, 1926 and March 13, 1928.
               Note the reservoir was not filled to capacity until March 2, 1928, 10 days before the failure
               (Committee Report for the State, 1928).

               ASSUMED COEFFICIENTS OF FRICTION

               One of the most vexing aspects of the St. Francis Dam failure was the sheer size of the dam’s
               displaced blocks of concrete. Some weighing  as much as 10,000 tons  were transported more
               than a kilometer downstream of the dam, and water was observed to be seeping from the dam’s
               concrete monoliths for weeks after the failure, testifying to the fact that mass concrete was nearly

               as impermeable as most had assumed.
                       For these reasons, a significant number of questions probed into the coefficient of friction
               assumed by the dam’s designers. W.W. Hurlbut, the senior BWWS Office Engineer stated that
               his office assumed the same coefficient of friction on St. Francis that had been employed at








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